“The ideal seaman is he who says and does the proper thing, in just the proper way and at the proper time, a man who has developed sea sense and nautical sagacity,” Alfred E Nicholls wrote in the 1942 edition of Nicholls’s Seamanship and Nautical Knowledge.
No words can ever describe the devasting tragedy of losing loved ones in the horror of a vessel sinking. And none can come even close to understanding the final moments of those who died gasping for air when the Bayesian sank on 19 August 2024, off Sicily’s north coast.
It is difficult to comprehend how a vessel as well designed and, without doubt, as well maintained as Bayesian, with a highly skilled master in Captain James Cutfield, could have sunk at anchor during a storm that had been forecast.
In discussing the issues arising from and post-sinking, this article considers two issues: statements by various parties about the sinking and the role of good seamanship in the circumstances.
Statements by various parties
Statement one: The vessel was unsinkable.
Vessels such as personal watercraft are unsinkable because they have enclosed or sealed hulls that cannot hold or retain any water. Bayesian sank.
Statement two: The aluminium mast snapped.
This is difficult to accept because the mast would have been designed to withstand shearing forces created by storms whose wind forces exceeded those generated by the storm that struck Bayesian – stated to have produced wind forces of six to seven on the Beaufort wind scale. Regardless, the Italian dive company have confirmed that the mast was intact.
Statement three: The vessel’s keel may have been raised fully or partially.
In their interview on TRT World, Yacht design expert Jean-Baptiste Souppex and oceanographer Simon Boxall explained some relevant matters to the interviewer:
“So we also know that the vessel has a lifting keel and at the time of the incident the keel was in its ‘up’ position meaning that the vessel had less stability that it could have had if it had been lowered,” Mr Souppex said.
Statement four: The vessel should have raised its anchor and sailed into Porticello for safety.
A master of a vessel – ship or yacht – with good seamanship skills, will never attempt to enter a port during a storm. This is because storm winds would adversely affect their vessel’s manoeuvrability, risking allisions, collisions and grounding. Masters with good seamanship skills will stay well clear of the coast, to prevent their vessel being driven by storm winds onto the coast. The investigators would be expected to consider this action.
Statement five: Points of entry
The vessel, while heeling/rolling during the storm, took on water through its open portholes; the hull door on the port side of the vessel’s stern; and other points of entry.
Portholes
Portholes on such vessels are permanently sealed and cannot be opened by passengers or crew.
Hull door
The sailing passenger vessel Sir Robert Baden Powell was anchored about 150 meters off Bayesian. Some of its passengers had dined ashore and returned to the vessel late in the night – just a few hours before the storm struck early the following morning. Captain Karsten Borner, the master, was aware of media claims about water entering Bayesian through, for example, the hull door on its port quarter allegedly left open by the crew. He asked his passengers if anyone had taken photographs of Bayesian when they returned to his vessel on the night previous. A passenger provided him with a photograph taken of the stern of the vessel showing the hull door closed – which photograph he produced during his interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel.
Other points of entry
Certain naval architects claimed that water could have entered the vessel through two large openings on the starboard side at deck level.
Italian Sea Group, (owner of the formerly bankrupt Perini Navi Group that built Bayesian), advised that the vessel had a down-flooding angle of about 45 degrees. Down-flooding is the term used to explain that, when a vessel is heeled (listed) to a certain angle to one side, water will commence flooding the vessel. Bayesian’s down-flooding angle of about 45 degrees meant that water would commence flooding the vessel when it heeled to about 45 degrees. It has been claimed that this angle should have been closer to about 60 degrees. Simply put, the claim is that the vessel should have started flooding at a greater angle of heel – say about 60 degrees, rather than the lower angle of about 45 degrees.
And so, the claim goes: when the vessel heeled to an angle of about 45º, uncontrolled flooding occurred through the deck-level openings, with water entering the saloon and adjacent internal areas in sufficient quantities causing the vessel to capsize and sink.
There are three problems with such a bald claim. First, even if the vessel heeled to about 45 degrees to one side, its righting lever would have caused it to heel to the opposite side. Continuous heeling from side to side is known as “rolling”. As long as the vessel kept rolling or heeling – even if on occasion it heeled to an angle greater than 45 degrees – there was insufficient time for the vessel to be subject to uncontrolled flooding. Secondly, the vessel could only have been subject to uncontrolled flooding, if it were held by some powerful force at an angle of about 45 degrees or greater to one side – more likely the starboard or right side with the large cutaways of the deck – which force overpowered the vessel’s righting lever, preventing the vessel heeling or rolling to the other side.
Before considering the third problem, it is important to mention, briefly, that the vessel is stated to have been vertically divided into six watertight (WT) compartments bounded by vertical bulkheads positioned at pre-determined distances across the breadth of the vessel. These compartments became WT because either the vertical bulkheads were unbroken or, if they were “broken” by openings such as doors, those openings could be closed with WT doors rendering the bulkhead watertight. The vessel is also claimed to have been designed to remain afloat if two of its six watertight compartments were flooded due to a collision, grounding etcetera. It is important to remember that the integrity of the WT compartments is dependent upon the bulkheads being watertight.
Returning to the vessel remaining heeled to an angle of or greater than 45 degrees enabling uncontrolled flooding of the vessel; in such a circumstance, at least three WT compartments would have to be flooded to sink the vessel.
This could occur if two adjacent WT compartments got flooded because the bulkhead between the compartments was not WT due to the WT door in the bulkhead not being closed; or the WT bulkhead between the second and third WT compartments was not WT because the door in it had not been closed, causing progressive flooding of the third WT compartment. Three flooded WT compartments could have sunk the vessel.
The investigators would consider the down-flooding angle’s compliance with applicable standards and the status of watertight bulkheads.
Statement six: The vessel was struck by a waterspout or downburst.
The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) defines a waterspout as “a whirling column of air and water mist”. Waterspouts fall into two categories, according to NOAA: fair weather waterspouts and tornadic waterspouts.
Waterspouts
“Tornadic waterspouts are tornadoes that form over water, or move from land to water. They have the same characteristics as a land tornado. They are associated with severe thunderstorms, and are often accompanied by high winds and seas, large hail, and frequent dangerous lightning,” the agency says.
NOAA meteorologist Kenneth Pryor advised in communications that, “a macroburst is a larger-scale downburst with a diameter between four and 40 kilometres,” citing work on downbursts by Ted Fujita and Roger Wakimoto and evidence that tornadoes and waterspouts can be generated by and can occur in close proximity to downbursts.
“Without access to weather radar this is difficult to confirm, but it is possible that the Bayesian was impacted by a small, short-lived tornadic waterspout embedded in the larger downburst wind flow field. Fujita documented several occurrences of downburst-induced tornadoes. [A] lightning map also signifies high downburst potential with a high flash density as the storm was approaching the north coast of Sicily. [There is also] a satellite microwave sensor-generated precipitation map that shows the system was composed of bowing segments typically associated with large-scale downburst and downburst cluster generation. Thus, it is possible that although the Bayesian was impacted by a possible tornado, surrounding vessels 150 meters away could be missed (by the tornado).
During discussions, Dr Pryor clarified that, because a waterspout comprises a mist of water, its effect on Bayesian would have been negligible, if that.
Downburts
NOAA defines downbursts as “powerful winds that descend from a thunderstorm and spread out quickly once they hit the ground”. The agency says these winds can easily cause damage similar to that of a 65-85-miles-per-hour tornado or even an 86-110-miles-per-hour tornado (56-74 knots and 74-96 knots, respectively), and are sometimes misinterpreted as tornadoes.
Dr Pryor advised that a downburst – specifically a macroburst – very likely occurred, based on the onshore surface weather observations around the time of the incident and satellite imagery analysed for this event. The macroburst would have affected Bayesian and the Sir Robert Baden Powell; however, he emphasised that a downburst was not the equivalent of a torrent of water flooding down into the vessel falling onto the vessel, as some commentators have suggested; rather, it was similar to very heavy and continuous rain that lasted about 10 to 15 minutes. The fact that the storm is reported to have lasted between 10-20 minutes, strengthens the possibility that it generated a macroburst.
Because a downburst was not a torrent of water that could have flowed down into the Bayesian resulting in its progressive flooding and eventual sinking, it is appropriate to consider the role such a downburst could have played in the vessel’s sinking.
Given that the winds in a downburst could reach speeds of between 56-96 knots, the following scenario could be in the realm of the possible: If the vessel was not being manoeuvred by the master during the heavy weather, leaving it to the mercy of the winds and weather generally, then, it is possible that, at some point, while the vessel was heeling or rolling from port to starboard, the vessel got trapped by the downburst’s powerful winds of between 56 and 96 knots that caused it to remain heeled to one side: the powerful force referred to above.
The continuous downburst over a number of minutes kept acting on the heeled vessel, increasing its heel beyond its down-flooding angle of about 45 degrees. At this angle the vessel commenced flooding and the progressive flooding of three watertight compartments as earlier noted, resulted in the vessel capsizing and sinking. To reiterate, such a scenario could only have occurred if the vessel was at the mercy of the storm viz it was not being manoeuvred. If Bayesian had been manoeuvred, then, it should have been able to ride out the storm as did the Sir Robert Baden Powell.
The role of seamanship in the sinking
The “elephant” in all of the scenarios discussed by the media and other parties, is the good seamanship that enabled Captain Borner to ensure the safety of his vessel – about 14 metres smaller than Bayesian – while facing the same storm.
It is relevant to note that the lack of seamanship or poor seamanship has, over the decades, been found by maritime law judges to be the cause of accidents such as collisions, fires, groundings and sinkings.
In his interview held after he had towed Bayesian’s drifting life raft with 15 survivors to his vessel, Captain Borner explained to GBNews the nature of the storm and the resultant tragedy.
“We got a very strong gust and we had to start the engine to keep the ship in anchored position and we watched the ship behind not to touch them. And we managed to keep the ship in position and after the storm was over we noticed that the ship behind us was gone.” The “ship behind” was Bayesian.
Captain Borner, having received news of the storm that, according to Simon and Jean-Baptiste had been forecast, was on the bridge of his vessel in sufficient time to start it engine; manoeuvre and control the vessel’s buffeting by storm winds; ensure his vessel did not drag onto Bayesian (anchored astern); and ride out the storm safely. His demonstrated good seamanship ensured the safety of his “smaller” vessel and leads to the uncomfortable question: if good seamanship enabled Captain Borner to ensure his vessel’s safety, then, similar good seamanship should have ensured the safety of Bayesian.
Good seamanship
Good seamanship required Captain Cutfield to be on the vessel’s bridge well before the storm struck; start the engines, which should have been on standby following receipt of the forecast storm; and prepare his vessel in accordance with the safety procedures for adverse weather. Preparation procedures would have included securing of all watertight doors (internally and externally), securing loose items to prevent them becoming missiles, alerting and assisting passengers as necessary and lowering the retractable keel to increase stability and reduce drift.
Captain Cutfield would also be required to consider whether it was prudent to raise anchor and head further offshore, given that his vessel is stated to have been anchored about 300 metres off the coast; about 200 metres off the breakwater and about 150 metres off the anchored Sir Robert Baden Powell. Further offshore would give him greater sea room within which to manoeuvre, should that have been necessary.
Matthew Griffiths, the sailor who was on night anchor watch duty, is quoted (by Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata) as telling prosecutors, that he “woke the captain up when the wind was blowing at 20 knots. He ordered to wake everyone else up. I then stored away the pillows and plants, closed the windows of the sitting room on the bow and some hatches”. Matthew’s statement conveys the slender implication that, of his own volition, he awakened the master – rather than in accordance with the master’s instructions.
Captain Cutfield’s actions before and during the storm, would be governed by good seamanship. The investigators would determine his exercise of good seamanship and the reason his vessel sank, while the smaller Sir Robert Baden Powell faced the same storm and remained afloat.
