ARE “dark fleet” ships painted black, or do they turn their lights off at night? It doesn’t work quite like that, but they certainly go to a lot of trouble to sail undetected.

The recent war between Russia and Ukraine has seen a large increase in the number of “dark fleet” or “shadow fleet” ships that are used to circumvent sanctions imposed by many countries on the sale of crude oil and LNG from Russia, as well as trying to avoid other sanctions.

Ships are usually identified by their IMO (International Maritime Organization) number. This is a unique number assigned to all sea-going merchant ships of at least 100 gross tonnage at the time of construction, generally upon the laying of the keel. This measure aims to enhance maritime safety, prevent pollution and facilitate the prevention of maritime fraud. The number is assigned to each ship for identification purposes and remains unchanged even if the ship were to be renamed, have a change of ownership or if it changes its flag of registration.

Another IMO requirement is that an automatic identification system (AIS) transponder is fitted on board ships of over 300 gross tonnage engaged on international voyages. The transponder transmits the ship’s IMO number, the type and size of the ship and its position, course and speed. The AIS is not supposed to be switched off and doing so might be to conceal illegal activities, which is exactly what happens with ships that are part of the dark fleet.

Flagging concerns

Lloyd’s List Intelligence estimates that the shadow fleet has grown to around 630 tankers, accounting for more than 14.5% of the overall global tanker fleet. The industry estimates that the number is even higher, at more than 800 tankers.

The numbers mark a rapid expansion following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and western restrictions on Russian energy exports, which has led to ships being hit with sanctions. There is now also evidence that, since the European pipeline gas trade has been cut off, Russia is boosting its LNG gas carrier fleet, including some ice-class vessels which are able to navigate the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic.

The shadow fleet uses “flag of convenience” shipping registry services, which means that vessels’ safety and inspection regimes are less stringent than those of more bona fide shipping registers. For instance, the shipping register of Gabon, a small Central African nation, recently doubled its number of ships on the register due to the reflagging of the Russian oil tanker fleet from the more reputable Liberian flag to avoid sanctions.

One of the ships on the Gabon register, a 1997-built oil tanker, exploded in Malaysian waters killing three crew members last year. The ship was a write-off, uninsured and had a history of transporting Iranian oil.

Other less reputable flag nations, such as Laos and Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Mongolia and Bolivia, all of which are landlocked, are following suit to assist the shadow fleet in transporting Venezuelan, Iranian, North Korean and Russian oil around the world. Unfortunately, many of these vessels are old, rusty and past their use-by date.

Global insurer Allianz recently issued its annual shipping report in which it noted: “Much of the shadow fleet is likely poorly maintained and may not have undergone appropriate inspections. The average age of the tanker fleet is now 12 years, according to data from Clarkson. Almost a third of vessels are older than 15 years, and the ranks of aging vessels is forecast to expand rapidly in coming years.”

Dangerous transfers

Shadow tankers also participate in the dangerous practice of ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in protected waters, also turning off their AIS transponders to obscure their identity. “Such vessels have been involved in at least 50 incidents to date, including fires, engine failures, collisions, loss of steerage, and oil spills,” according to Allianz. The IMO recently called on flag states to crack down on the illicit activities of shadow tankers and enforce regulations on STS operations. The IMO has also asked port states to subject potential shadow vessels to enhanced inspections.

To avoid some of the sanctions “dark ship-to-ship” meetings take place in protected waters. North Korean-affiliated vessels were spotted conducting unofficial STS operations in the Sea of Japan off the coast of North Korea to transfer oil which originated in Russia.

Moving Russian oil through European waters has come under greater scrutiny recently. An area in the Mediterranean off the southeast coast of Greece has seen Russian-linked tankers involved in STS transfers over the past couple of years. In the north of Europe, countries are proposing a greater crackdown on Russia’s shadow fleet passing through the region, concerned about the potential for an environmental catastrophe with a number of near disasters reported among the ageing fleet of tankers over the past year.

Two large oil tankers were recently involved in a collision in Malaysian waters resulting in fires on board both vessels. One of the vessels, the Ceres 1, a very large crude carrier, has been known to be involved in the transfer of Iranian oil, contrary to US sanctions, and has been observed of frequently turning off its AIS transponder. The vessel has Chinese owners and is registered in Sao Tome a flag-of-convenience registry. Crew members of both vessels were reported to be safe as of late July. Iranian officials denied that any Iranian oil was on board the vessel.

The big concern is that some older vessels – the global fleet is now the oldest in almost two decades – may not be properly inspected and maintained, leading to a catastrophic accident at sea. “They’re an environmental disaster waiting to happen,” according to Lars Barstad, chief executive officer of the management unit of Frontline Plc, one of the largest owners of supertankers. Let’s hope the shipping industry works collectively to avoid this happening.

This article appeared in the August | September edition of DCN Magazine