By Ross McBurnie
NOW That a few days have passed since the tragic collision in the North Sea between the ‘M/V Solong’ and the tanker ‘M/V Stena Immaculate,’ I wanted to take a moment to share my thoughts from a nautical perspective. In addition to expressing my opinion, I’d also like to clarify some key technical details for those who have been asking questions.
I understand that many in the industry are cautious about expressing opinions or drawing conclusions, especially given the tragic loss of life and the limited facts available at this stage. However, I’d like to clarify that any opinions shared here are my own, informed by 20 years of seagoing experience and my status as a Master Mariner. My aim is to present this piece based on the facts as we currently know them, and I will clearly indicate where assumptions have been made. I am certainly not here to apportion blame, that is for legal proceedings to come and of course the MAIB investigation to shed light on what went wrong.
The Collision: What We Know So Far
At Approximately 09:48 on March 10th the ‘MV Stena Immaculate’, lying at anchor approximately 10 nautical miles off of the Humber estuary, was hit on her port side by the ‘MV Solong’. Looking at AIS data from the time of the collision, the ‘MV Solongs’ speed was approximately 16 knots. Given her maximum speed is stated as 18 knots, it is fair to assume this was her full transit speed and would indicate that no evasive action was taken by the crew of the Solong. Another assumption would therefore be that the bridge was either unmanned, the watchkeeping officer distracted elsewhere, or incapacitated for some reason.
Visibility & Reaction Time
From statements given by the attending rescue vessels—who undoubtedly did an outstanding job in recovering the abandoned crew amid the inferno—it is clear that visibility was very poor during the initial stages of the search and rescue operation. A Met Office warning of fog for the area at the time of the incident supports this assessment.
Given these conditions, it is reasonable to assume that the watchkeeping officers on both vessels would not have had a visual sighting of each other until very late. Assuming a closing speed of 16 knots and a visibility of 1 nautical mile—though from the reports it may well have been even less, the officer would have had a maximum of 4 minutes. At 1/4 of mile this would have left very little time to react.
For the crew of the Stena Immaculate, which was at anchor, this would have been far too little time to take any evasive action. For the Solong, travelling at such speed, the officer on watch may have considered it too late for significant manoeuvring and instead opted for a bow-first collision—where the collision bulkhead is located—potentially preventing water ingress into the larger cargo holds aft of it. Looking at AIS data, it appears no change of course was made and it was a direct hit as the MV Stena Immaculate lay on her heading to the North East.
Bridge Watchkeeping: What Should Have Happened?
None of this, however, accounts for the full range of tools available to the bridge watchkeeping officer. With visibility severely reduced, a reduction in speed would typically be expected—especially given that the vessel was transiting near the coast, in an area of high traffic density, and close to the entrance of a busy river.
Under such conditions, standard practice would be to double the bridge watch, ensuring an additional lookout alongside the duty officer. Furthermore, both vessels would be expected to sound their whistles at the prescribed intervals, alerting other craft in the vicinity to their presence.
Radar & AIS: Could the Collision Have Been Prevented?
And of course, what about the effectiveness of the radar watch? Even in poor visibility, it would be reasonable to expect each vessel to detect the other on radar at around 16 nautical miles. Given their proximity to the coast, it is likely that both vessels were operating on a radar range no greater than 12 nautical miles. Even at this reduced range, there would have been approximately 45 minutes of warning before the collision occurred—ample time for situational awareness and corrective action.
It will be interesting to review the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) data if released, particularly regarding any VHF communications between the vessels. Did the Stena Immaculate repeatedly attempt to contact the MV Solong to clarify their intentions as the collision course became apparent?
It is also important to note that, despite being at anchor, the Stena Immaculate would still have been required to maintain an effective anchor watch. This means the bridge officer should have been actively monitoring the situation using all available means, including radar, AIS, and visual lookout.
AIS: A Tool, Not a Guarantee
There has been some discussion around the role of AIS and its associated collision alarms in this incident. It’s important to clarify that AIS is a mandatory system for vessels of this size and, based on available MarineTraffic data, it is reasonable to assume both ships were transmitting. However, that does not guarantee that either vessel was receiving this data. Malfunctions in AIS reception are possible, and it is also possible that the vessels’ Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) was not properly configured to display AIS targets.
For those unfamiliar, ECDIS is the digital equivalent of a traditional nautical chart. Historically, navigators would plot their intended course on paper charts and periodically fix their position using celestial navigation or, more recently, GPS. Today, this process is digital, with ECDIS displaying real-time navigation data on the bridge. AIS is one of many tools available to the watchkeeping officer—it should never be relied upon in isolation but can provide valuable situational awareness when cross-referenced with visual lookout and radar.
However, as history has shown in multiple maritime incidents, over-reliance on electronic systems can be dangerous. It is critical that these tools are properly configured, actively monitored, and used in conjunction with fundamental seamanship principles to avoid collisions.
If neither vessel had acquired the other on radar, it is highly likely that neither crew would have been aware of the impending danger. However, if the target had been acquired, and the radar’s alarm settings were correctly configured, an audible ‘Closest Point of Approach’ (CPA) warning should have sounded, alerting the watchkeeper to take early action.
Fatigue & Short-Sea Shipping: An Overlooked Factor?
The final point to consider is the operational demands placed on the MV Solong, a feeder containership engaged in short-sea voyages. These vessels make frequent, short port calls, leaving crews with little opportunity for adequate rest. Typically, such ships operate with a Captain, Chief Officer, and Second Officer rotating sea watches (4 hours on/8 hours off) continuously for weeks or months.
Beyond their bridge duties:
- The Chief Officer must also oversee cargo operations.
- The Second Officer handles passage planning, GMDSS maintenance, and safety/firefighting equipment.
- The Captain manages port arrivals/departures, while also dealing with inspections and audits.
Given these demands, it’s easy to see how fatigue could have played a role in this incident. While every vessel holds a Safe Manning Certificate, the minimum crew numbers required often fail to ensure a safe and sustainable workload.
Seafarers must comply with STCW Hours of Rest Regulations, including:
- Maximum 14 hours of work in any 24-hour period.
- At least 77 hours of rest over 7 days.
- Minimum 10 hours of rest per 24 hours (split into no more than two periods).
While exemptions exist for emergencies, these regulations are legally binding. However, in reality seafarers often exceed these limits due to operational pressures and a reluctance to report fatigue for fear of job loss. Those with boots-on-the-deck experience know that fatigue remains a persistent, unaddressed issue in the industry.
Foul Play?
In times of global geopolitical instability, it would be remiss not to acknowledge the possibility of foul play. Reports have confirmed that the Master of the MV Solong is a Russian national, while the Stena Immaculate was carrying 220,000 barrels of jet fuel destined for the U.S. military. The irony of this situation is not lost, but I sincerely hope that this remains a tragic accident rather than something more sinister.
Lessons to Be Learned – Preventing the Next Tragedy
This tragic incident serves as a stark reminder of the critical importance of vigilance, situational awareness, and adherence to fundamental navigational principles at sea. As the investigation unfolds, the maritime industry must take a hard look at bridge resource management, the effectiveness of electronic navigation aids, and the persistent issue of crew fatigue—particularly on short-sea trading vessels. While we await the findings of the official inquiry, one thing is certain: collisions like this should never happen. It is the responsibility of all seafarers, companies, and regulatory bodies to ensure that the lessons learned from this tragedy lead to meaningful improvements in training, oversight, and operational safety—before another avoidable disaster takes place.
Article written by – Ross McBurnie MNI ASOMWS – Master Mariner.
