AUSTRALIA’S biosecurity efforts seem to hang on a constant knife-edge between preservation and tribulation. Our island nation is unique in how seriously we defend our coastal borders from invasive pests, diseases, and weeds. These threats from overseas threaten to ravage some of the nation’s key industries if introduced, such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. One needs only look to the ill-fated, albeit self-inflicted decision in 1935 to introduce the cane toad, ironically to control agricultural pests, to see the damages and difficulties that can arise from the introduction of foreign pests, especially in the case of fauna, which can become widespread in the sensitive Australian ecosystem.
Australia has come a long way since the costly cane toad error, completing a 180-degree change over the following 89 years, with matters of biosecurity given significant priority from top down.
The scrupulous nature of processes employed by members of the various agencies responsible for executing Australia’s biosecurity duties has been known in the past to draw the ire of shippers, particularly when a vessel or its cargo is rejected for having not met the high standard required. All restrictions are enforced with this vital mission of protection in mind. This attention to detail has so far been an effective tool in the constant war against invasive pests, but it is a reasonable question to consider; are the processes currently in place the most comprehensive to protect Australia going into the medium-term future?
DAFF proactive to stay on top of threats
Operational processes go a long way, but human intervention can only do so much; it is an impossible task to check every vessel, every container, and every vehicle stowed onboard incoming vessels. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (DAFF) however has been active in making changes over the previous year to ensure the constant threat from invasive pests is kept in check.
The 1st of July this year saw the introduction of AusTreat, DAFF’s new pre-border biosecurity treatment scheme, which replaced the previous Offshore BMSB Treatment Provider Scheme. AusTreat is intended to give the department greater confidence in the effective application of biosecurity treatments from overseas vendors.
The scrupulous nature of processes employed by members of the various agencies responsible for executing Australia’s biosecurity duties has been known to draw the ire of shippers, particularly when a vessel or its cargo is rejected for having not met the high standard required.
On AusTreat’s launch, DAFF said, “This is a significant milestone in Australia’s pre-border biosecurity risk management”.
“Our new scheme will ensure biosecurity risk is managed at its source, before it arrives on Australia’s shores.”
The department believes AusTreat will reduce the need for manual intervention at the border, and therefore expect clearance processes to become quicker and cheaper for both industry and consumers, as well as allow the department to redirect resources to “higher risk pathways”.
According to DAFF, the AusTreat scheme will also be active in responding to changes in risk over time.
“For example, if a new pest emerges as a biosecurity threat to Australia, treatment providers already registered under AusTreat will be able to treat goods without the need to register under a different scheme, leading to faster and more dynamic responses to biosecurity threats.”
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The new scheme may address a known trend whereby shipping lines whose vessel is held or rejected for entry at the border elect to sail the vessel to overseas ports and conduct treatment elsewhere, independent from any involvement or quality assurance from DAFF, before returning to Australia.
September 1 this year, the official start of Australia’s BMSB season, saw that treatments carried out in countries identified for BMSB target risk, on high-risk goods, must now be carried out by an AusTreat-registered treatment provider.
Digging deeper
At a legislative level, the federal government has continued its support for the proposed Biosecurity Protection Levy, which if implemented would see funding of the commonwealth biosecurity system shared across a number of parties including; taxpayers, importers, Australia Post, and primary producers, including those in the agricultural industry.
The Biosecurity Protection Levy is just one part of the 2023-24 budget measure Strengthened and Sustainably Funded Biosecurity System, and the bills that would provide the framework for the levy are currently being reviewed in the Australian Senate, which meant the levy did not commence for 1 July this year as the Federal Government had initially planned.
The proposed levy has drawn criticism from some within the primary producer sector, including the National Farmer’s Federation (NFF), which released a document earlier in the year detailing its opposition to the levy. The NFF asserts Australian farmers already contribute enough to biosecurity funding, claiming they pay billions through existing levy systems and on-farm activities. The organisation believes the proposed levy doesn’t recognise existing contributions from farmers, and claims the government has ignored calls from the industry to put a levy on container imports, arguing that as importers create biosecurity risks, they should be responsible for some costs associated with managing those risks.
Importantly, it should be noted that primary producers would only be required to contribute 6% to total biosecurity funding, with taxpayers and importers contributing 44% and 48% respectively.
Three bills created to provide the imposition, collection and administration of the levy were introduced before the Parliament in February. DAFF has stated, “The proposed Biosecurity Protection Levy would ensure that those who directly benefit from Australia’s strong biosecurity make a modest and direct contribution to ensure the biosecurity system is sustainably funded into the future”, the department explaining that whilst existing investments from primary producers are important, these do not directly fund the cost of biosecurity activities undertaken at the border.
Biofouling: Tell us the new rules again?
New biofouling regulations are now being enforced in Australia following the end of an 18-month “education” phase in December last year. The Biosecurity Amendment (Biofouling Management) Regulations 2021 entered into force in June 2022, requiring operators of vessels to provide information on biofouling management practices prior to arriving in Australia.
The Department of Agriculture says its inspection processes have been improved to help streamline inspections for compliant vessels, while gathering additional information from non-compliant vessels to assess the biosecurity risk the vessel presents.
Operators of commercial vessels now have a choice of three options pertaining to management of biofouling; Implementation of an effective biofouling management plan and record book, clean all biofouling within 30 days prior to arriving in Australian territory, or an alternative biofouling management method which must be pre-approved by the department.
What does an industry specialist say?
Ingmar Kofler is an experienced marine diver with years of experience in the field, and the director of K-ROV, an Australian company that specializes in underwater hull cleaning. Mr Kofler also has a Master of Environmental Studies and Bachelor of Marine Science, Marine Biology and Biological Oceanography from Sydney’s Macquarie University.
Speaking to DCN, Mr Kofler agrees with the implementation of the new biofouling regulations in theory, but believes confusion exists surrounding the exact requirements.
“The new regulations that have been brought in place would provide Australia with a strong and robust tool to manage biofouling as well as preventing the introduction of aquatic invasive species (AIS),” Mr Kofler said.
“The biggest issue that I see at this stage is that the seriousness of the various departments involved has not been properly communicated to the industry.
“Add to that the overall confusion by large parts of the industry about the actual laws in place themselves and it appears to me that at present a lot slips through the net.”
Mr Kofler affirms that in terms of actual biofouling management and underwater hull cleaning, nothing significant has changed, as Australia has always tried to ensure that cleaning is enforced overseas due to ever higher demands that are simply not feasible anymore.
“It can only be hoped that there is a change to the approach taken to help communicate and enforce the requirements that are technically now in place, or it is questionable how they will in fact make any difference in Australia’s attempts to keep AIS out of the local ecosystems, as well as managing biofouling,” he said.
“The Federal Government cannot even provide us with guidelines on how systems need to be tested to be approved onshore, hence industry is forced to focus on offshore operations which makes the whole exercise more expensive and more dangerous to operators.
“For the time being that is the only real option we have to provide a consistent service to our clients, looking at the pace of movement on these issues I don’t see that changing in the short term.” Speaking on any current or emerging threats from underwater entities, Mr Kofler said, “Since overall monitoring feels lacklustre at this stage we are very rarely faced with specific outbreaks of invasive species or the like, and since we already undertake all our work offshore it would not affect our operation profile if we did”.
July this year also saw the government announce delivery of an additional $47.1 million in funding to the biosecurity system under a revised fees and charges regime that was first announced in mid-2023.
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry minister, Murray Watt, said the changes would help create an effective long-term funding model.
“Prior to the review in 2023, fees and charges for importers had not changed since 2015, but the costs of delivering biosecurity and imported food regulatory activity had increased,” Mr Watt said.
“That’s why 12 months ago we moved to align cost recovery fees and charges with the actual cost of delivering biosecurity activities.”
Uncertainties in process from existing cases
Despite change being driven at a Parliamentary level to bolster biosecurity, at a practical level certain incidents have left a question mark over the preparedness of the government for various scenarios. October 2023 saw the arrival to Australia of Glovis Caravel, a Bahamian-flagged PCTC intending to complete a discharge of vehicle units at the major east coast ports. Problems arose when during discharge at the Port of Brisbane a stevedore discovered a live stinkbug.
The case attracted national media attention in part because of the vessel’s cargo, hundreds of new Tesla units’ whose arrival was keenly anticipated by Australian customers. Unprecedented however was the bureaucratic hardship Glovis Caravel faced during its two-month sojourn attempting to re-gain approval to discharge at our ports.
The vessel was fumigated a total of four times over the October to December 2023 period to eradicate the stinkbugs. The fumigation process was conducted by a well-respected and global pest control vendor, but each fumigation saw DAFF officers board the vessel (tied up at a layup berth) to find more live pests. It was eventually discovered that insects were found living inside vehicle units, significantly hindering the fumigation process. The DAFF office in Canberra was responsible for approving certain decisions made of the vessel during this period, including the right to berth for fumigation, (and then in December, to berth for onboarding of essential provisions, needed at that time after so many weeks at anchorage). DAFF Canberra, following the fourth unsuccessful fumigation attempt, gave the vessel its final direction notice; either fumigate the ship using Methyl Bromide, a much stronger chemical than what had been used, or depart Australian waters.
Reluctant at that time to depart, the shipping line opted to proceed with the Methyl Bromide fumigation, despite the chemical being known to cause damage to vinyl and leather, both found inside Tesla’s. For reasons yet unknown, DAFF did not revert with approval to proceed with the fumigation which it had previously given the option for. A period of inaction and confusion followed, during which response times from DAFF appeared to lack haste, each response requesting further information or clarification on various matters, before eventually the shipping line opted to sail the ship back to Asia in late December 2023, putting a conclusion to what had become an ordeal for all parties.
A look at the saga in hindsight asks major questions of DAFF’s preparedness and ability to solve what was a complex question of biosecurity process and risk management. If the safest decision following four failed fumigation attempts was to order the vessel to depart Australian waters, why was the vessel given a choice to instead fumigate with a chemical that may have caused damage to the cargo? From an internal viewpoint, DAFF appeared either unsure or unwilling to make a decision to resolve the case.
Some in the industry that were close to the case suspected DAFF offered the choice, believing the shipping line would view the bromide as an unacceptable risk and make the decision to sail for themselves, thus theoretically eliminating DAFF from potential blowback regarding loss of productivity and revenue, or damaged cargo.
But perhaps the most important question to take from that incident; what if it happens again? Has the department learned from Glovis Caravel, and will the same scenario play out in the future? Arguably, the message it sent to shippers that may face the same problem is not to seek BMSB treatment in Australia but instead sail overseas. In the case of the Glovis Caravel, the vessel sailed to China, where the cargo was restowed onto a separate vessel, before the units eventually returned to Australia and were discharged. The extent of the biosecurity treatment aboard Glovis Caravel or its cargo in China is unknown; it was reported that DAFF did not pay special attention to the restowed cargo upon its return, rather it was subject only to the same routine processes as other PCTC’s on arrival to Australia. The adoption of the AusTreat program now at least gives DAFF some visibility into the processes of overseas vendors in treating BMSB and other pests, but as to whether Glovis Caravel was a precursor of future incidents, only time will tell.
